ABSTRACT Vague concepts are represented by L-fuzzy sets. It is argued that any vague concept carries with it an approximate identity which is a fuzzy equivalence relation. The relation also fulfills the criterion of ? indiscernibility of Identicals ?, which is called ? saturatedness ? in this context. An application in knowledge representation is indicated.

This two-volume Encyclopedia of Global Justice, published by Springer, along with Springer's book series, Studies in Global Justice, is a major publication venture toward a comprehensive coverage of this timely topic.

The chapters in this volume deal with timely issues regarding democracy in theory and in practice in today's globalized world. Authored by leading political philosophers of our time, they appear here for the first time. The essays challenge and defend assumptions about the role of democracy as a viable political and legal institution in response to globalization, keeping in focus the role of rights at the normative foundations of democracy in a pluralistic world.

This book is a collection of original essays by some of the leading moral and political thinkers of our time on the ethical and legal implications of humanitarian military intervention. As the rules for the 'new world order' are worked out in the aftermath of the Cold War, this issue is likely to arise more and more frequently, and the moral implications of such interventions will become a major focus for international law, the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO, (...) and the foreign policies of nations. The essays collected here present a variety of normative perspectives on topics such as the just-war theory and its limits, secession and international law, and new approaches toward the moral legitimacy of intervention. They form a challenging and timely volume that will interest political philosophers, political theorists, readers in law and international relations, and anyone interested in moral dimensions of international affairs. (shrink)

In this book, eleven leading theorists debate the normative challenges of preventive war through the lens of important public and political issues of war and peace in the twenty-first century. Their discussion covers complex and topical subjects including terrorism, the 'Bush doctrine' and the invasion of Iraq, Iran's nuclear capabilities, superpower unilateralism and international war tribunals. They examine the moral conundrum of preventive intervention and emphasize the need for a stronger and more effective international legal and political order and a (...) corresponding re-evaluation of the normative status of international law. Together their essays form a challenging and timely volume that will be of interest to scholars in ethics and political philosophy, political theory, international relations, international law and peace studies and to general readers interested in the broader issues of peace and justice in the new world order. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

Are people with flawed faces regarded as having flawed moral characters? An “anomalous-is-bad” stereotype is hypothesized to facilitate negative biases against people with facial anomalies (e.g., scars), but whether and how these biases affect behavior and brain functioning remain open questions. We examined responses to anomalous faces in the brain (using a visual oddball paradigm), behavior (in economic games), and attitudes. At the level of the brain, the amygdala demonstrated a specific neural response to anomalous faces—sensitive to disgust and a (...) lack of beauty but independent of responses to salience or arousal. At the level of behavior, people with anomalous faces were subjected to less prosociality from participants highest in socioeconomic status. At the level of attitudes, we replicated previously reported negative character evaluations made about individuals with facial anomalies, and further identified explicit biases directed against them as a group. Across these levels of organization, the specific amygdala response to facial anomalies correlated with stronger just-world beliefs (i.e., people get what they deserve), less dispositional empathic concern, and less prosociality toward people with facial anomalies. Characterizing the “anomalous-is-bad” stereotype at multiple levels of organization can reveal underappreciated psychological burdens shouldered by people who look different. (shrink)

This paper identifies the field of work as an adventure of consciousness and uses a new phrase to describe it—WORKSHIP, work as worship. Based primarily on the classical psycho-philosophy of India, laid down in the vedantic literature, this model of workship attempts a shift in paradigm from the Greek concept of work as 'ponos' or pain to a liberating dimension of work, the ultimate aims of which are ananda and mukti. Examining the various elements that constitute workship, the author comes (...) up with the fourfold paths of workship: discipline, righteousness, sacrifice and transcendence, and analyses them in detail. Finally, the paper argues that workship has the potential to unfold man's latent spirituality for a sustainable world order. 1. Rene Fonere; 'Krishnamurti and Modern Thought', in The Mind of J. Krishnamurti, p. 170. 2. Willis Harman and John Hormann; Creative Work: The Constructive Role of Business in a Transform ing Society, p. 13. 3. S.K. Chakraborty Management by Values, p. 166. 4. Sri Aurobindo; 'Right Attitude in Work', quoted in All India Magazine, p. 5. 5. Ibid., p. 32 6. 'The Meaning of Work', in Man, Work and Society, ed. William Nosow and William H. Form, p. 18. 7. Wayne W. Dyer; You Will See It When You Believe It, p. 41. 8. 'The Meaning of Work', p. 4. 9. Ibid., p. 35. 10. Swami Gambhirananda; 'Taitiriya Upanishad', in Eight Upanishads, Vol. 1, p. 392. 11. Jyoti Sobel and Prem; The Hierarchy of Minds—A Compilation from the Works of Sri Aurobindo and The Mother, p. 55. 12. Ibid., p. 69. 13. Ibid., p. 76. 14. Ibid., Introduction, p. XIII. 15. World Scripture: A Comparative Anthology of Sacred Texts, ed. Andrew Wilson. 16. Chakraborty, Management by Values, p. 164. 17. Swami Vivekananda; Pearls of Wisdom, p. 202. 18. The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, ed. Shri man Narayan, Vol. 4, Chapter 3. 19. Sri Aurobindo; The Message of the Gita, p. 80. 20. World Scripture, p. 638. 21. Ibid., p. 620. 22. Ibid. 23. Ronald Robertson; Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, p. 93. (shrink)

These essays, as the editor has very aptly put it, indeed “provide insights into both Indian philosophy and Mohanty—Indian philosophy via Mohanty and Mohanty via and beyond Indian philosophy”. Though the articles were written on different occasions, I think there is a central idea around which colorful strands of thoughts are woven. Mohanty’s main preoccupation here is to build a bridge between tradition and modernity through hermeneutic reinterpretation. This is how in every epoch outstanding philosophers have advanced philosophical thinking by (...) examining issues from within the tradition. For like men, concepts and words too grow in course of time. So, shows Mohanty, Samkara, Gandhi, Aurobindo, K. C. Bhattachryya, N. V. Banerjee, B. K. Matilal, P. K. Mukhopadhyay—all were engaged in this exercise in their own way, at their own times; only the tools of analysis were different in each case. (shrink)

We recently argued that—contrary to what we call the dominant view— physicians ought to avoid engaging patients on religious grounds.1 The six responses to our article present an array of concerns and have provided us with the opportunity to consider further aspects of our view. While we cannot reply to all the relevant issues, our aim here is to reply to the most significant concerns. Against our Public Reason Argument, Nick Colgrove maintains that physicians are not relevantly akin to public (...) officials and should therefore not be constrained by public reasons. Colgrove does not take issue with the idea that it may be reasonable for public officials to justify their policymaking according to public reasons because their policies affect a diverse population. But since ‘the [medical] decision being made is not binding for other patients,’ physicians need not be constrained by public reasons.2 Colgrove’s criticism hinges on the claim that deliberation ought to be constrained by public reason only if the outcome of such deliberation is a policy or a rule that a diverse group of people must follow. We disagree with this claim. We do not believe, nor did we argue, that this is a necessary condition for when we are morally required to cite public reasons. Instead we believe that three facts together provide sufficient reason for why physicians should generally be constrained by public reasons: physicians are directly and indirectly paid by the state via Medicare and Medicaid; physicians allocate public resources; and physicians are regulated by the state. Colgrove takes particular issue with our ‘Dr Chatterjee case’, which is meant to illustrate why citing religious reasons is inappropriate. And our explanation for why we find this case jarring …. (shrink)

Indians in London is a riveting narrative that investigates the lives and experiences of numerous Indians who visited, stayed, and left their mark in the imperial capital of London from around the...

This book sets Gaudda in historical context and develops a commentary that makes the meaning and significance of the Alatasaanti text clear. In the Alatasaanti , Gaudda uses terms made familiar by Buddhism in order to expound his Vedantic philosophy. It places him at the watershed between Mahayana Buddhism and Vedanta. Among the important issues discussed are Gaudda's radical doctrine of non-production (ajati), that is, the view that despite appearances nothing is ever actually brought into existence; his notion of the (...) illusory nature of sensory experience; his conviction that reality is "not two" (and certainly not more than two); his theory of knowledge; and the "touchless yoga" he hoped would dispel our illusions about ourselves and our world. His logic and the content of his arguments are examined critically. "This is a very useful and valuable work. The topic is a central one in Indian philosophy, yet not many books and none in recent times, have ventured to explore it. The author does a persuasive job, especially given the controversial nature of the topic. The book's chief merit is its clear and readable style. The format clearly elucidates the Ajativada of Gaudda through critical and historical introduction, summaries, translations and commentary. This is a work which will not only draw general readers who are interested in Indian philosophy but also serious scholars who are concerned about textual interpretations. The translation of the text is very well done, both in terms of readability and authenticity." -- Deen K. Chatterjee, University of Utah. (shrink)

The discourse on the integration of science and Islam is being realised through the establishment of various Islamic religious universities in Indonesia. One of the Islamic universities that accommodates this discourse is the Al-Qur’an Science University, Central Java, Indonesia (UNSIQ). This study aims to examine the basic concept of scientific integration at the UNSIQ and critically analyses the academic tradition and research development patterns based on the Lakatos research development pattern, both of which are hard-core and auxiliary hypotheses. This research (...) shows that the scientific base at the UNSIQ has been structured in an awareness that supports the establishment of a distinctive academic tradition and scientific culture in the framework of al-Qur’an-based academic knowledge. However, research as auxiliary hypotheses in building scientific paradigm is still limited in certain disciplines and needs to be improved. This needs to be a common concern in order to increase the scientific base of the Syajarah al-Qur’an into a solid scientific paradigm.Contribution: This research figured out that the scientific base at the UNSIQ has been structured in an awareness that supports the establishment of a distinctive academic tradition and scientific culture, but this scientific base needs to be supported by research plan and researches in various disciplines. Thus, those researches become the auxiliary hypotheses to build a particular scientific paradigm of this university. (shrink)

Cotton examines Plato 's ideas about education and learning, with a particular focus on the experiences a learner must go through in approaching philosophical understanding.

Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...) fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because (...) it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection. (shrink)

The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we (...) are in a position to know that they are in bad faith. (shrink)

Is behavioral integration a necessary feature of belief in folk psychology? Our data from over 5,000 people across 26 samples, spanning 22 countries suggests that it is not. Given the surprising cross-cultural robustness of our findings, we argue that the types of evidence for the ascription of a belief are, at least in some circumstances, lexicographically ordered: assertions are first taken into account, and when an agent sincerely asserts that p, nonlinguistic behavioral evidence is disregarded. In light of this, we (...) take ourselves to have discovered a universal principle governing the ascription of beliefs in folk psychology. (shrink)

Recent work has argued that there may be cases where no attitude – including withholding – is rationally permissible. In this paper, I consider two such epistemic dilemmas, John Turri’s Dilemma from Testimony and David Alexander’s Dilemma from Doubt. Turri presents a case where one’s only evidence rules out withholding (without warranting belief or disbelief). Alexander presents a case where higher order doubt means one must withhold judgment over whether withholding judgment is rational. In both cases, the authors conclude that (...) no doxastic attitude is warranted. In this paper, I argue against the possibility of these epistemic dilemmas. I argue that withholding cannot be irrational in either case. But meditating on the dilemmas gives us an important – and overlooked – insight into the nature of rational withholding. First, rational withholding is a function of evidence failing to sufficiently support belief or disbelief. As a result, withholding is not symmetrical to belief and disbelief. Second, there can be two distinct grounds for rational withholding. First, propositional withholding, which arises when our evidence does not support belief or disbelief in p. And second, doxastic withholding, which arises when we cannot determine whether our evidence supports belief or disbelief in p. Accepting two grounds of rational withholding licenses a kind of Weak Permissivism. But this Weak Permissivism should not be troubling to anyone. (shrink)

As our knowledge of the functional and pharmacological architecture of the nervous system increases, we are getting better at treating cognitive and affective disorders. Along with the ability to modify cognitive and affective systems in disease, we are also learning how to modify these systems in health. “Cosmetic neurology,” the practice of intervening to improve cognition and affect in healthy individuals, raises several ethical concerns. However, its advent seems inevitable. In this paper I examine this claim of inevitability by reviewing (...) the evolution of another medical practice, cosmetic surgery. Cosmetic surgery also enhances healthy people and, despite many critics, it is practiced widely. Can we expect the same of cosmetic neurology? The claim of inevitability poses a challenge for both physicians and bioethicists. How will physicians reconsider their professional role? Will bioethicists influence the shape of cosmetic neurology? But first, how did cosmetic surgery become common? (shrink)